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The Striking Netherlands:  
Time Series Analysis and Models of Socio-economic 
Development and Labour Disputes, 1850-1995 
Sjaak van der Velden & Peter Doorn* 
Abstract: In the past 150 years, about 15.000 strikes took 
place in The Netherlands. This article gives an overview of the 
trends in aggregate strike activity from 1850-1995. A compos-
ite index is constructed, which reflects the number of strikes, 
the number of strikers and number of strike days. On the basis 
of the literature, a theoretical model is constructed which seeks 
to explain variations in strike activity over time. In order to test 
the model, the properties of the time series are inspected. De-
spite a number of shortcomings in the data, an attempt is made 
to test the model using correlation and regression analysis. The 
theoretical model can however not be substantiated by the em-
pirical data. The strike activity appears to be an almost random 
series (after log-transforming and removing the trend from the 
data). It is suggested that catastrophe theory and non-linear or 
chaotic models cast light on the patterns observed, but the se-
ries is considered too short an empirical testing. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose of the research 
Although many books and articles have been written about strikes in the Neth-
erlands, an overview of the subject was lacking until recently. Recently, an 
extensive research was finished, in which the available information on almost 
                                                          
*  Address all communications to: Sjaak van der Velden, International Institute for Social 
History (IISG), Cruquiusweg 31, 1019 AT Amsterdam, E-mail: svv@iisg.nl.  
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15.000 strikes that took place in the Netherlands between 1830 and 1995 was 
compiled on the basis of books, magazines, newspapers, archives, etc.2 This 
article is based on the data related to strikes for the period 1850-1995. We will 
try to describe the patterns of aggregate strike behaviour over the past century 
and a half, and to investigate the complex interrelations between economic, 
political and institutional developments, and the willingness of workers to 
strike. 
A strike is the temporary stoppage of work by employees in order to enforce 
certain demands. It was noticed that until the end of the nineteenth century 
Dutch people often used the English word ‘strike’ or French ‘grève’. Only 
slowly the word ‘staking’ was adopted, although as far back as the seventeenth 
century the Dutch had used the very Dutch word ‘uitscheiding’ (cessation). The 
fact that this word was not used again in modern capitalism illustrates the de-
cline of the Dutch economy during the eighteenth century. Different forms and 
goals of a strike exist. Contrary to most existing research ‘lock-outs’ are not 
included in this research, because these are not regarded as actions of workers3, 
whereas, on the other hand, ‘occupations of companies’ are treated as a specific 
form of a strike.  
Because wage-earners sell their ability to work, they try to get the best price 
possible. At the same time they want to work under the most pleasant working 
conditions. These are the two most important strike reasons, but because the 
state has gained increasing control over both, more and more strikes are di-
rected against the state. Besides these, there are also altruistic reasons, e.g. 
support of sacked colleagues, the unions or fellow-strikers. 
Whereas in the nineteenth century a strike was often begun by a group of 
workers, roaming the streets, singing and waving a red banner, at the end of the 
twentieth century most strikes are triggered off by a union decree. These two 
opposites should not lead to the assumption that there is a linear development, 
because a constant struggle exists between the ‘workers’ movement’ and the 
‘movement of the workers’. Every time when the unions seem to be in control 
of the workers, there occurs an outburst of wildcat strikes. On the other hand 
such an outburst can lead to a radicalisation of the unions. 
Kerr and Siegel suggested that the workers most prone to strike are those 
who do unpleasant work and live in an isolated mass. In the Dutch situation 
this only goes for nineteenth century navvies, peat-cutters and workers in gov-
ernmental employment programs (Werkverschaffing and DUW). For the rest 
which workers are more strike-prone turns out to be dependent on the situation 
                                                          
2  Sjaak van der Velden, Stakingen in Nederland: arbeidersstrijd 1830-1995 (Amsterdam, 
2000). With CD-ROM. 
3  In 1993 labour statisticians of the ILO agreed on taking strikes and lockouts separately in 
statistics. See: International Labour Organization, The Fifteenth International Conference of 
Labour Statisticians, Resolution concerning statistics of strikes, lock-outs and other action 
due to labour disputes (January 1993). 
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of the labour market or their importance in the technical production. However, 
the differences between groups of workers tend to diminish with time. At the 
end of the twentieth century we envision police-officers, bank-clerks and 
teachers on strike. A century ago this was unthinkable. 
In the Netherlands in the early 1920’s the average number of strikes ex-
ceeded 300 per year while in the 1990’s the average was only 44. Looking at 
the number of strikers the impression is the reverse: in the 1920’s 47.000 
whereas in the years 1990-95 we counted more than 135.000 workers per year 
on strike. In order to measure and investigate aggregate strike activity, it is 
necessary to construct a composite index. There are three or four indicators for 
strike-activity: frequency (the number of strikes and number of affected com-
panies), intensity (the number of strikers) and duration (the number of working-
days lost due to strikes). Strike-activity is measured as an average of the indica-
tors related to the national totals. The construction of the index is discussed in 
more detail in paragraph 2.2. 
The index shows that at the end of the period of our research strike-activity 
reached higher peaks than ever before. Although the frequency and duration 
declined, this was off-set by for the enormous growth in the number of strikers. 
During fewer and shorter strikes the modern wage-earners reach very high 
levels of strike-activity because of their vast numbers.  
In this article we try to explain the fluctuations in strike activity. Many ex-
planations are in circulation and some authors emphasise economic factors 
while others point out that the fluctuations are caused by political or institu-
tional developments. In the economic tradition we composed a model in which 
thirteen independent variables play a part over the years 1850-1995 (paragraph 
2). To test the model we applied correlation and multiple regression-analysis. 
Before doing so, we first had to take into account the statistical particularities 
of the time-series data available (paragraph 3 and 4). 
2. A theoretical model of strike activity 
2.1. Presentation of the model 
Is it possible to explain strike behaviour economically, politically and from the 
development of unionisation? Many authors have tried to make such explana-
tions and we will try to fit these into a model. It is commonly accepted that 
workers are more inclined to strike when the economic situation is booming. It 
is then that labour can get a bigger piece of the cake. The reverse is supposed to 
be true during a slump; strike activity declines because the chance of winning 
is small. 
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To test this general idea it is necessary to select proper variables. Variables 
that not only represent the general state of the conjuncture (e.g. the Dow Jones 
index), but also the direct results for working class life. In accordance with 
existing research, Dutch and international alike, we selected: unemployment, 
real wages and the price-index for consumer goods. Besides these three we also 
took two general variables: the development of National Income per capita and 
the more subjective vision on the conjuncture. So we selected five independent 
variables in order to try to explain the development of strike activity, the de-
pendent variable (see Model 1). 
 
Model 1. Five economic variables explaining strike activity 
 
The expectations in the model are as follows. Next to the arrows we find the 
expected direction of the correlation: ‘+’ means that the expected correlation is 
positive, which means that the dependent variable is supposed to rise if the 
independent variable rises and vice versa; ‘—’ means a negative correlation: if 
one variable goes up, the other goes down. 
Economic factors are of course not the only variables explaining strike be-
haviour and therefore we also created a model with political and legal factors 
as independent variables. In this sub-model we include the percentage of votes 
for left-wing parties during parliamentary elections and the influence these 
parties had in the respective governments. This influence is measured by calcu-
lating the percentages of ministers supplied by the left-wing parties. The third 
variable is the freedom of strike connected with the socio-economic measures 
taken by the governments. 
We expect first of all the left-wing influence in the government to rise with 
growing numbers of left-wing votes. Second the leftist government is supposed 
to enlarge the freedom of strike which in turn should lead to a growth in strike 
activity. Thirdly it is plausible to expect that workers are more eager to strike in 
times of more powerful left-wing parties, while on the other hand unions will 
Real wages
Conjuncture
Price index
Unemployment
Strike activity
+
_
+
+
_
+
+
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be more reluctant to engage in strike-activities when left-wing parties are rep-
resented in the government. After all, the unions for a great part share a com-
mon history with the social-democratic party. The above expectations are rep-
resented in Model 2. 
 
Model 2. Political variables explaining strike activity 
 
As a result of the considerations we end up with two conflicting expectations. 
More votes for left-wing parties can correspond with more strike-activity, but 
because of the influence of labour-unions these same left votes can also corre-
spond tot less strike-activity. This brings us to the over-all influence of unions 
on strike behaviour, the third part of our model. It is agreed that unions flourish 
in times of economic booms and we can measure this by looking at the organi-
sation rate (union-members as a percentage of the dependent labour force). In 
following the Dutch labour-historian Th. Van Tijn we also take the percentage 
of workers working under collective agreement as a measure of the success of 
unions. This leads us to the third part of our model (Model 3, next page). 
This third part contains two elements, which connect this sub-model with 
the other two sub-models. If we actually connect them we end up with one 
extended and complicated model to which we can add two other variables 
connecting the economic and political parts. These are the collective sector 
(government expenditure and social insurances) and labour’s share in National 
Income (see Model 4, next page). 
 
Strike activity
Left-wing votes
Left-wing influence
Freedom of strike
+
+
+
+
_
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Model 3. Variables reflecting influence of labour unions explaining  
strike activity 
 
 
Model 4. Strike Activity Model composed of the variables in Models 1-3 
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2.2. Measuring strike activity 
So far we have chosen the dependent and independent variables for construct-
ing and testing a model on strike behaviour. More is to be said about how these 
variables are measured. First we will look at strike activity. Most international 
statistics concerning strikes include not only strikes but also lock-outs. If one 
wants to calculate how much working-time is lost by labour disputes it makes 
sense to incorporate them. We are looking for an explanation for the inclination 
to strike by wage-earners, so for us it does not make sense to incorporate lock-
outs. 
Apart from the problem of lock-outs there is the fact that most official statis-
tics include workers not directly involved in strike activities too. These workers 
are the ones that are unable to work due to the strike. Again, in researching 
strike behaviour this figure must be omitted. After eliminating lock-outs and 
workers not directly involved, we were left with 14.500 strikes. For each year 
we have four indicators: number of strikes (N), total number of strikers (S4), 
number of affected companies (C) and the total of working-days the workers 
were on strike (D)5. 
In 1966 P. Galambos and E.W. Evans tried to connect three of these indica-
tors in one index in order to compare in the incidence of strikes in several in-
dustries6. In this index they related S and D to the total labour force (W, all 
workers). Good old Knowles in the same Bulletin wondered why Galambos 
and Evans did not also relate N to W. We from our part wonder why one 
should relate strikes and lost working-days to people at all. People ought to be 
related to people, days to days and so forth. We therefore adjusted the formula 
as follows: 
It =100 x {[ ( Nt + Ct x st) + S t / S b + D t / D b] / [ (Nb + Cb x s b) + W t / W b + V t / V 
b ]} 
In this formula, s stands for the number of strikers per company7 and V for the 
total labour volume (the number of days to be worked by all workers) in a 
given year. The subscripts indicate this given year ( t ) and a basis year ( b) that 
is to be chosen by the researcher.  
By using this formula we could not solve one specific problem: the indica-
tors are not weighted. Weighting them can only be subjective: an adherent of 
peaceful industrial relations will place more emphasis on the diminishing num-
                                                          
4  Workers that struck more than once during one year were nevertheless counted only once. 
5  This not necessarily equals the working-time lost for the employers, because the latest can 
go on producing during the strike with the help of blacklegs. 
6  P. Galambos and E.W. Evans, Work-stoppages in the United Kingdom, 1951-1964: a quan-
titative study, in: Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of economics & statistics, vol. 
28, 1966, p. 33-55 
7  C x s  S, because we counted workers that struck more often only once in S 
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ber of strikes while a Marxist may point to the growing number of strikers. We 
therefore acquiesce in it that we are not able to weight the indicators. 
Objections may also be raised that the first component of the formula is of 
another magnitude than the second and third components. We have experi-
mented with several alternatives to overcome this handicap, which however did 
not offer significantly different outcomes. 
Another disadvantage is the intransparency of the formula. Our answer to 
that is given by the correlations between the index on the one hand and the 
original indicators on the other. The correlations between the index and fre-
quency, intensity and duration of the strike-movement are reflected in Table 1. 
Given these correlations the index seems to give a fair reflection of the original 
indicators. 
 
Table 1. Correlations between the strike-index and the original strike-indicators 
 
Index frequency 
(number of 
strikes) 
intensity 
(number of 
strikers) 
duration (number of 
working days lost 
due to strikes) 
 
 
1 0.7 0.95 0.86 index   
 1 0.64 0.81 frequency   
  1 0.88 intensity   
   1 duration   
 
2.3. The independent variables 
In our model we have eleven independent variables. Most of them need no 
further explaining: the development of real wages and prices are taken as in-
dexes. Unemployment is measured as a percentage of the dependent labour 
force. The votes for left-wing parties are also taken as a percentage and the 
same goes for the influence of these parties in the government. The organisa-
tion rate is again a percentage and unsurprisingly the number of workers under 
collective agreement is a percentage. We need not say anything about the col-
lective sector and labours share in National Income, but there are two variables 
that cause more problems. 
Conjuncture is measured by taking the annual growth rate of the National 
Income against constant prices, but also as a ‘mirror of the economy’. Econo-
mists and historians over the years have judged the economic situation as posi-
tive or negative and these judgements gives us a binary list of ones and zeros 
from 1857 on. This list is the second indicator for the conjuncture. 
The other variable with a high rate of subjectivity is ‘freedom to strike’. To 
enable us to computerise the model we translated the legal development and the 
development of economic policy into six ordinal data. The extreme values of 
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these data are: (1) total freedom to strike and a very reluctant government 
(1873-1902 and 1982-1995) and (6) Prohibition to strike and during some 
periods even a capital offence and state regulation of labour relations (1940-
1945).  
3. Statistical properties of time-series data related  
to strikes 
Before we can test the hypothetical model developed above, we must inspect 
the statistical properties of the data available. If we want to estimate the rela-
tionships between the variables, we must take into consideration that we are 
dealing with time series. As the variables that play a role in the model can be 
considered as interval/ratio variables, correlation and regression analysis may 
serve as appropriate techniques to measure relationships among them8. The 
strike index is the dependent variable in the model. When using correlation and 
regression for data that are not time series, we have to be aware of problems 
connected to the normality of the data (e.g. the effect of outliers) and of multi-
collinearity (independent variables that statistically explain the same variance 
in the dependent variable; such variables display a high degree of mutual corre-
lation). 
When applying correlation and regression analysis to time-series data, the 
effects of trend, autocorrelation, and time lags may also be of influence. In 
addition to this, not all data are available for all years. In the analysis presented 
here, we concentrate on the period 1850-1995, a total of 146 years. For only 63 
years (mainly after World War I), not one variable is missing. In earlier quanti-
tative studies, which seek to explain strike activity in The Netherlands, almost 
nothing is found on these statistical complications. We think, however, that 
without taking into account the statistical properties of the time series data, the 
interpretation of the results is virtually impossible. 
                                                          
8  The variable representing economic boom or depression is a binary variable, which may be 
treated as an interval variable. The variable representing institutional strike restrictions is an 
ordinal variable, which we will however treat as interval. The percentage of votes for left-
wing parties and of cabinet ministers from left-wing parties change only at election years 
and have therefore limited numbers of values. 
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Table 2. Independent variables used to explain strikes in the Netherlands,  
1850-1995 
 
Variable Explanation 
Nominal wage Index number of nominal wages, 1990=100 
Real wage Index number of real wages, 1990=100 
Price index Index number of consumer prices, 1990=100 
Unemployment Unemployment as percentage of dependent labour 
force 
Left government Percentage of cabinet ministers from left-wing parties 
Freedom of strike Institutional strike restrictions  
Union membership Union members as percentage of dependent labour 
force  
Collective agreement Percentage of employees under a collective labour 
agreement 
Wage quota Labour income quota as percentage of national income 
Collective sector Collective sector as percentage of national income 
National income Index of national income per capita, 1990=100 
Economic level Economic boom (1) or depression (0) 
Left-wing votes Percentage of votes for left-wing parties 
 
3.1. Trends, cycles and the effect of outliers 
Two time series that display a trend will always be correlated. The stronger the 
trend is in comparison to other components of the time series (such as cyclical 
and irregular effects), the stronger the correlation will be. Two series with 
either a positive or a negative trend correlate positively, two series with oppo-
site trends correlate negatively. A trend that we observe may however be dis-
torted by outliers and/or extreme values.  
All variables to be taken into consideration in the models to explain strike 
activity, except two, show a positive trend. The variable representing the strike 
restrictions has a negative trend, and for unemployment the trend is virtually 
absent. Therefore, practically all simple (bivariate) correlations are influenced 
by the trend effect.  
A trend in a time series can be stochastic or deterministic. In a deterministic 
trend model, the average level of a series grows or declines according to a 
specific function of time. Many time series do not exhibit the stability of a 
deterministic trend, but have trends with variable growth. In a stochastic model 
the parameters randomly change over time.9  
                                                          
9  N.R. Farnum & L.W. Stanton, Quantitative forecasting methods (Boston, 1989), 451-452. 
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The pattern of strike activity can be seen as transitory fluctuations around a 
deterministic trend line; alternatively, the trend can be a non-stationary stochas-
tic process akin to a random walk. Such processes contain a unit root in their 
autoregressive representation and require first differencing for stationarity.  
The unit root test, originally developed by Dickey and Fuller, takes as its 
null hypothesis a unit root in the autoregressive representation of the time se-
ries.10 The first differences then follow an autoregressive process of known and 
finite order. The alternative hypothesis is that the largest autoregressive root is 
smaller than one, so the series is a stationary autoregressive process added to a 
deterministic trend. 
Research on the development of the American GDP since 1870 shows that 
the presence of outliers can lead to the spurious rejection of the unit root hy-
pothesis: ‘Outliers that alter the level of output for only one period reliably 
trigger false rejections of the unit root hypothesis when it is true and signal the 
presence of permanent shifts in trend that did not occur’.11 Nelson and Murray 
go so far as to propose to move away from the unit root issue completely. They 
call the method fragile, stating that ‘determinism is not an hypothesis that is 
supported either in economic theory or in history [...] A statistical model im-
plies a conditional distribution of future observations given the data, not simply 
an accounting of past events.’ 
Not all variables to be correlated can be regarded as normally distributed. 
Some variables display a high skewness or kurtosis, which is partly caused by 
outliers and/or extreme values.12 Such values tend to have a major effect on 
trends in time series. The strike index itself appears to be the most problematic 
in this respect (Figure 1). The kurtosis of 71.7 of the strike index indicates that 
the series is extremely peaked. The skewness of 7.8 shows that there are many 
years where the index is lower than the average. There are 7 extreme values 
and 13 outliers (all positive) in the strike index (this amounts to 14% of the 146 
values). The most extreme value is found in the year 1970, where the strike 
index is over 1500; the other extremes are over 200, the first of which occurs in 
1943; the remaining five are all after the year 1979. The 13 outliers are all 
above 70 and they all occur since the 1920’s.In short, , the pattern in the series 
is heavily influenced by a few years, especially after World War II, when the 
strike index was extremely high). 
                                                          
10 D.A. Dickey & W.A. Fuller, ‘Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series 
with a unit root’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74 (1979), 427-431. 
11 Ch.R. Nelson & Ch.J. Murray, ‘The Uncertain Trend in U.S. GDP’, Working Papers in 
Economics (Research paper, University of Washington), January 21 (1997), 28 pp. Elec-
tronic publication at http://netec.wustl.edu/WoPEc.html 
12 Outliers are defined here as values of between 1,5 and 3 times the interquartile distance 
away from the mean; extremes have values of more than 3 times this distance. 
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Figure 1: Strike index (original data and regression line), 1850-1995 
Figure 2: Strike index with outliers and extreme values removed, 1850-1995 
 
When we remove outliers and extremes, the overall impression of the strike 
index time series changes considerably (Figure 2). The characteristics are: 
Strike index with outliers and extreme values removed, 1850-1995
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• there is still a clear overall positive trend. 
• there are indications that the best line to fit the data is not a linear re-
gression line, but a polynomial curve with a local maximum around 
1920 and a local minimum around 1950. 
Deleting the outliers would severely restrict the period for which we can con-
struct models of strike activity: before 1911 many independent data are miss-
ing; after 1940 many outliers and extreme values in the strike index occur. An 
analysis of the period 1911-1940 only would remain. 
On the basis of the above discussion, we decided to remove the trend and to 
reduce the effect of the outliers in the following ways. One possibility to re-
move a trend is to calculate the trend line and then to subtract the trend from 
the data. The disadvantage of this transformation is that deviations from the 
trend tend to be smaller where the original values are smaller. When a trend is 
positive, this phenomenon means that deviations in the early years will be of 
less influence than those in later years. Another widely used detrending tech-
nique is to take the so-called ‘first differences’. The method of first differences 
means that we calculate the change from year to year. This is the method we 
use in this study. 
We decided to reduce the effect of the extremes and outliers by taking the 
logarithm of the original data instead of removing them manually. The skew-
ness and kurtosis are then reduced to around zero (-0,37 and -0,11 respec-
tively). After taking the logarithm of the strike index, the positive trend in the 
data becomes clearer. A linear trend in the logarithmic series gives a good fit, 
but a polynomial represents the data even better. The curve indicates a slow-
down in the strike intensity from the 1930s to the 1960s (Figure 3). 
Except for the trend, there are also a number of variables that display a more 
or less cyclical pattern. This is most clear in the variable representing the eco-
nomic progress (influenced by business cycles) and is less clear in the variables 
representing votes for left-wing parties, membership of the unions and presence 
of left-wing parties in the government. Trend and/or cycle, either together or 
apart, are present in all variables eligible for the model. All variables have 
some form of autocorrelation (meaning that an observation in a given year is 
influenced by the previous year). The only exception is the (untransformed) 
strike index: here the autocorrelations for the first fifteen time lags are negligi-
ble (the highest autocorrelation is 0,24 at 10 lags). After taking the logarithm, 
the autocorrelation is substantial (gradually decreasing from 0,74 at lag 1 to 
0,40 at lag 15; see Figure 4). 
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Figure 3: Lognormal strike index and non-linear regression line (1850-1995) 
 
Figure 4. Autocorrelation function of log-transformed strike index 
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3.2. Autocorrelation and spectral analysis 
Although the number of observations is limited, it is interesting to inspect the 
characteristics of the time series of the strike index in its own right. It has al-
ready been noted that the strike index series in its original form does not have a 
distinct statistical pattern. The series is strongly influenced by a number of 
peaks in 1970, 1991, the first half of the 1980s, and 1943. After taking the 
logarithm of the series, an upward trend is the most remarkable characteristic 
(Figure 3). But what remains after we remove the trend from the data by taking 
the first differences of the log-transformed strike index? Calculating the auto-
correlation function (ACF) of the now stationary series can shed light on the 
fluctuations in the strike activity from year to year. A rather strong negative 
autocorrelation of -0,46 appears to exist at lag 1: this means that there is a 
tendency that a year with a high strike index is followed by a year with a low 
strike index. In a diagram of the (detrended, log-transformed) strike index over 
time, a rather strong zigzag pattern prevails. The autocorrelations at higher time 
lags are fluctuating around zero. They are not strong enough to indicate a cycli-
cal pattern (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. ACF of log-transformed, detrended strike index 
 
 
The best indication for the presence (or absence) of cycles in the strike index 
can be obtained with the help of spectral or Fourier analysis. We must however 
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keep in mind that the series is relatively short (146 years or observations) to get 
definite results. For spectral analysis, the series to be analysed must be de-
trended. If the observations in the series are independent of each other (i.e., 
there is no periodicity), and they follow the normal distribution, such a time 
series is also referred to as a white noise series (like the white noise one hears 
on the radio when tuned in-between stations). A white noise input series will 
result in periodogram values that follow an exponential distribution. 
We carried out the spectral analysis on the (detrended) log-transformed data, 
since the outliers would too heavily bias the analysis of the original strike in-
dex. The impression of the periodogram is indeed one that resembles a (nega-
tive) exponential or logarithmic distribution (Figure 6). The highest periodo-
gram peaks and spectral densities appear to occur at the lowest frequencies. 
The periodogram and spectral density diagram resulting from the Fourier 
analysis do therefore not indicate any clear cyclical pattern of strike activity. 
Figure 6. Periodogram of log-transformed strike index, 1850-1995 
3.3. Consequences for the model 
To summarise, in any analysis to test the relationships between explanatory 
variables and the strike index, we must take into account the following statisti-
cal properties of the time series:  
Periodogram of lognormal strike index, 1850-1995
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• The strike index has some strong outliers; the influence of these outliers 
can be reduced significantly by taking the logarithm of the original se-
ries.  
• The (log-transformed) strike index shows a positive trend; the trend ef-
fect can be removed by taking the first differences. 
• The strike index has a negative autocorrelation at one time lag, meaning 
that a zigzag pattern prevails. 
• There is no cyclical pattern in the strike index: the detrended, normal-
ised strike index series resembles a series produced by chance (a ‘white 
noise’ series). 
• Some explanatory variables are mutually correlated and may cause 
multicollinearity. 
• Trend and/or cyclical patterns are present in practically all explanatory 
variables. The trend can be removed by taking the first differences of 
these variables. 
This means that the prospects of finding a meaningful and statistically signifi-
cant explanatory model of the behaviour of the strike index series over time by 
a combination of the independent variables are not very good. Nevertheless, an 
attempt was made to construct and test a multiple regression model on the basis 
of the theoretical considerations outlined in paragraph 2. 
4. Testing the model 
4.1. Correlation and regression analysis 
Before we attempted to construct a multiple regression model, we first carried 
out simple correlation analysis between the strike index and the thirteen ex-
planatory variables. The directions of the relationships are generally in line 
with our theoretical expectations. Because of different measurement methods 
(and length of observed period) for some variables, some discrepancies with 
the calculations by earlier researchers exist (notably the correlation with unem-
ployment and the price development by Van Dam van Isselt13; when we con-
form to his definitions, the differences are negligible). 
 
                                                          
13 E.W. van Dam van Isselt, “Over het verband tusschen werkstakingen, werkloosheid en 
prijzen”, in: De Economist 1914, p. 1-9. 
 239
Table 3. Correlation of strike index and thirteen explanatory variables 
 
 Correlation with 
Independent variable Data avail-
able for 
years 
Ex-
pected 
correla-
tion 
Strike 
index 
(original 
series) 
Log-
trans-
formed 
strike 
index 
First differ-
ences of log-
transformed 
strike index 
Nominal wage 1880-1995 + 0,26 ** 0,44 ** 0,04  
Real wage 1880-1995 + 0,30 ** 0,49 ** 0,22 ** 
Price index 1880-1995 + 0,26 ** 0,44 ** -0,08  
Unemployment 1911-1995 - -0,08  -0,03  -0,10  
Left government 1921-1995 + 0,07  0,23 * -0,08  
Strike restrictions 1850-1995 - -0,09  -0,30 ** 0,07  
Union membership 1911-1995 + 0,08  -0,01  -0,15  
Collective agreement 1911-1981 - 0,09  -0,06  -0,19  
Wage quota 1921-1995 + 0,25 * 0,35 ** -0,03  
Collective sector 1921-1994 + 0,21  0,27 * -0,12  
National income 1900-1994 + 0,28 ** 0,35 ** 0,20  
Economic level 1857-1995 + 0,06  0,21 ** 0,11  
Leftwing votes 1880-1995 + 0,17  0,47 ** -0,04  
 
Note: * = significant at 95%; ** = significant at 99%. Although the correlations were calcu-
lated on the basis of population numbers, we can use the significance levels as an indication 
for the relative strength of the coefficients. 
 
However, as discussed above, the outcome of the correlation analysis will be 
influenced by outliers and by the trend effect. We removed both influences in 
two steps. First we recalculated the correlations after taking the natural loga-
rithm of the strike index. It is remarkable that practically all correlation coeffi-
cients are now considerably higher than before. It is easily demonstrated that 
this is to a large extent due to the trend present in most variables. After remov-
ing the trends by taking the first differences of all variables, the correlations are 
reduced notably. The highest remaining correlation coefficient is that with real 
wage (0,22). Half of the correlations are 0,10 or less (Table 3). 
Given the characteristic of the strike index time series, anything else was 
hardly to be expected. The chances of finding a multiple regression model 
explaining a significant part of the variance in the dependent variable are there-
fore slight. The interrelations between the de-trended independent variables are 
often much higher than those between independent and dependent variables, so 
that those relations may furthermore be distorted by multicollinearity. 
A variety of regression models have been estimated, but not one of them 
was satisfactory. Variations attempted were: 
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• to delete missing values pairwise (per pair of variables all cases are in-
cluded in the analysis for which data are available) or casewise (all 
variables included in the model must have non-missing values); in total, 
no more than between 48 and 62 cases of the total series of 146 years 
were included in the analysis). 
• for the trendless non-interval variables we used the original values as 
well as the first differences 
• to apply (forward) stepwise regression and standard regression tech-
niques. 
Although we are confident that the strike index is a fair reflection of the origi-
nal indicators (frequency, intensity and duration), we nevertheless also tested 
these indicators. The results were as disappointing as testing the index. 
In conclusion, not one model had an explained variance of more than 20%, 
the regression parameters were barely significant (except for the real wage 
variable, which already appeared from the correlation analysis), and the results 
were rather sensitive to the regression technique used. 
4.2. Breakdowns by periods  
Hitherto we have not been able to compute satisfying results for the long run. 
However, it may be possible that the theoretical insights are true for the short 
run. Maybe, what cannot be proven for a period of 150 years is valuable for 
shorter periods. 
We therefore broke the whole period down into 20-year periods. For some 
relations we now calculated much higher correlations, while changing direc-
tions partly explain the low values for the whole 150-year period. The highest 
correlation was R= -0.75 for unemployment and the strike index in the years 
1911-1920. More surprising is the positive correlation R= +0.33 during the 
years 1921-1940, because this outcome is contradictory to most literature on 
the relationship between strikes and unemployment. The second highest is R= -
0,65 for strike restrictions in the 1901-1920 period. The third highest is R= -
0.55 for union membership during the sixties and seventies of the twentieth 
century. A result that is in line with left-wing criticism of union-leaders: while 
the unionisation rate grew, strike proneness diminished. No higher correlations 
were found. So, breaking down the whole model in shorter periods also leads 
us nowhere. 
5. Conclusions and directions for further research 
So far, we have not been able to statistically explain variations in strike activity 
in The Netherlands between 1850 and 1995. There are various reasons for this 
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lack of statistical success, a number of which we have already looked into. The 
theoretical model that was tested, which was discussed in paragraph 2, was 
derived from the literature on strikes in The Netherlands and abroad. Data has 
been gathered from a multitude of sources to operationalise the central proc-
esses as well as possible. Of course, there were flaws in the data and missing 
values were a serious problem. Moreover, the statistical properties of the time 
series data were duly taken into consideration. Correlation and regression 
analysis did bring along a number of handicaps when applied to the data. Per-
haps other (nonparametric or non-linear) techniques could have been used, but 
it is our contention that those would not have led to different insights. 
Is the model on strike activity wrong (or too simplistic)? Are we generally 
driven by false hope in socio-economic historical research, when we expect to 
find significant relationships between variables over long periods of time?14 It 
is of course so that over a time period of a century and a half, both structural 
changes and disrupting events take place, that are extremely difficult to disen-
tangle. When looking for structural relationships over time, the implicit postu-
late is that in the long run, the effects of incidents tend to level each other out. 
This assumption can however not be proven. The influence of events such as 
wars and crises may be much more important than the structural effects. The 
whole meaning of what is structural and what is not may even change over 
time. Does it make sense to compare, for instance, votes for left-wing parties in 
the 1990s to those in the 19th century? Are we still talking about the same phe-
nomenon? Statistically the answer is affirmative, but the whole idea of what 
constitutes a left-wing party has changed over time. And is it realistic to expect 
that the factors influencing strike activity do so in a consistent way? For in-
stance, the economic policies of governments with left-wing influence have so 
much changed over time, that it is unlikely that the variable ‘government influ-
ence of left-wing parties’ works out in a similar way over the decades. 
Or maybe we are simply expecting too much. As we discussed above, most 
variables in the strike model (including the strike index itself) displayed a 
trend. Perhaps discussing which trends co-occur should satisfy us, although 
then we will never be able to say anything further that can be measured. 
Alternatively, striking may be heavily influenced by accidental factors; fac-
tors, that cannot be easily linked to broad socio-economic and political struc-
tures. The fact that the strike index had practically no cyclical pattern and, 
except for a negative autocorrelation at lag 1, mainly had the appearance of a 
white noise series, raises the question how such a pattern emerges. It does not 
seem likely that strikes take place by chance alone. 
                                                          
14 Peter Doorn, ‘The old and the beautiful: a soap opera about misunderstandings between 
historians and models”, VGI Cahier 10 (1998), pp. 11-30. 
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5.1. Explaining the inexplicable: catastrophe theory  
and chaos models 
Decisions to strike take place in stress situations. The many different reasons 
for strikes to ‘break out’ are discussed in van der Velden’s dissertation. Certain 
conditions must be met, but there will be a tension between the options to strike 
or not to strike. In this sense, the outbreak of a strike can be considered as a 
specific case of a bifurcation model or a so-called cusp-catastrophe. 
Zeeman has described the cusp-catastrophe15 with the help of an example 
from animal ethology. Rage and fear in animals (and humans) are conflicting 
factors influencing aggression. When an animal is angry, it will fight; when it 
is scared, it will flee. But what happens when it is enraged and afraid? It will 
attack or run away, and a sudden jump (the attack or retreat catastrophe) be-
tween both forms of behaviour (originally described by Konrad Lorenz) may 
occur. Catastrophe theory, later extended to chaos theory, may offer a model 
for forms of behaviour that show sudden jumps. These models have been ap-
plied to describe a variety of phenomena, ranging from turbulence in meteorol-
ogy to the outbreak and spread of contagious diseases in medicine. In the social 
sciences, chaotic models serve more as metaphors than as testable theories. 
Andreev, Borodkin and Levandovskij attempted to apply chaos theory to 
strike activity in Russia between 1895 and 190816. Their series of 168 monthly 
observations is however much too short to offer definite results (according to 
Nijkamp, over 10,000 observations are necessary to apply chaotic models re-
sponsibly)17. Our series of 146 observations is even shorter than the Russian 
series, and it was not attempted to fit non-linear dynamic models to the data. 
The cusp-catastrophe may be an appropriate model to describe the outbreak of 
individual strikes, in which dissatisfaction with labour or political conditions 
competes with the fear of loss of income or job. The pattern observed in the 
strike series can be seen as the summation of the thousands of strikes that have 
taken place over the past one and a half century or so. Strikes sometimes spread 
like the proverbial wildfire, and chaos theory has been applied to describe 
diffusion processes successfully. 
                                                          
15 E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory: selected papers 1972-1977 (Addison-Wesley, 1977), pp. 
3-7. 
16 A. Andreev, L. Borodkin & M. Levandovskij, “Using methods of non-linear dynamics in 
historical social research: application of Chaos Theory in the analysis of the Worker’s 
movement in pre-Revolutionary Russia”, Historical Social Research 22 (1997) 3/4, pp. 64-
83. 
17 P. Nijkamp, “Voorspelbaarheid en chaos”, Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde. Nieuwe reeks 55:4 (1992), pp. 5-29. 
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5.2. Directions for further research 
In summary, our research seems to be disappointing because we did not come 
up with a valid model. We think however that the outcome of the above is very 
instructive. Using several statistical techniques we were able to show that most 
assumptions about strike behaviour simply cannot be verified. Theories on 
strikes need to be refined by studying in more detail where, when and how 
strikes occur. The role of worker activists for example may play a more signifi-
cant role than can be tested in a socio-economic model. 
One way forward seems to be to analyse strike activity for several shorter 
periods. In fact, van der Velden did do this in his dissertation, for the period 
1911-1940 and for the period 1945-1995, and for periods of between 15 and 30 
years.18 The correlations between the ‘independent’ variables and the strike 
index appear to fluctuate over time, which are an indication for the possible 
presence of not one, but a variety of ‘models’ (all different) statistically ex-
plaining the strike activity.  
Of course, we do not plead for an atomising of strike research. Besides the 
detailed study of strikes and workers' protest in general, a scientific approach 
can contribute to a better understanding. After all, the negative results of our 
research have taught us much about the many easily made assumptions about 
human behaviour. Without these statistical techniques history will be nothing 
more than plain story-telling. 
                                                          
18 Van der Velden, op cit., p. 272-273. 
